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a b s t r a c t
We study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access
to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework
tomodel the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest
amount of users, thus selﬁshlymaximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned
game are characterized under different mobile traﬃc conditions, RSU capabilities and users
requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where
mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of ﬁnding an
access solution decreases.
Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between
vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an ex-
ample, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having
users inclined to increasing their “acceptable” price may force vehicle Internet providers to
charge lower prices due to competition.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction1
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) recently attracted2
much interest from the research community as a core net-3
working component to build up intelligent transportation4
systems (ITS) to improve road safety, optimize the humans5
and goods mobility, and disseminate real-time context infor-6
mation on traﬃc loads, congestion and hazardous situations.7
The applications enabled by VANETs are not only limited to8
safety-oriented ones, but also extend to leisure applications9
related to Internet access and entertainment along the road.10
A comprehensive classiﬁcation of VANETs applications can11
be found in [12].12
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 223993695; fax: +39 223993413.
E-mail address: cesana@elet.polimi.it, macesana@gmail.com,
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The design of VANET architectures to support leisure ap- 13
plications has attracted the attention of recent work and re- 14
searchers; as an example, the Drive-thru Internet [22] project 15
targets the provision of affordable Internet connections to 16
vehicular users through road side Wireless LAN infrastruc- 17
ture. The scope of the research covers network access, roam- 18
ing, handover, authentication, etc., and the achieved results 19
show that despite a number of technical challenges to be ad- 20
dressed, providing Internet for highly mobile vehicular users 21
is possible [21–23,25]. The CABERNET [7] and Infostations 22
[28] projects propose architectures similar to Drive-Thru In- 23
ternet. Motivated by these works, we expect that the provi- 24
sion of Internet connectivity via road side infrastructure will 25
be a ﬂourishing market in the next future attracting Internet 26
providers which may possibly compete among themselves. 27
This competition may have a valuable impact on customers 28
welfare, as well as inﬂuence the quality and cost of all afore- 29
mentioned features about road safety. 30
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008
1389-1286/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008
2 V. Fux et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESS
JID: COMPNW [m3Gdc;June 27, 2015;11:20]
The scientiﬁc literature already counts a number of stud-31
ies of competition between classical Internet access providers32
(see, e.g., [1,15] or [16, Chapter 5]). In many cases, the in-33
teractions among users (through congestion) are also con-34
sidered, and taken into account by access providers [9,10].35
However, to the best of our knowledge the case of provider36
competition in vehicular networks has not been deeply in-37
vestigated, although it has some important speciﬁcities; in-38
deed customers are mobile and move in a limited speed39
range and, more importantly, in constrained directions. In40
this work we want to ﬁll this gap by providing a study of41
duopoly competition, between providers owning one road42
side unit (RSU) each, along a stretch of road. These road43
side units are able (besides all other features) to provide44
Internet access to mobile users, whose cars are equipped45
with a device called on-board unit (OBU). We study how46
providers strategically set their price for providing Internet47
connectivity in response to the competitor’s pricing strat-48
egy with the selﬁsh objective of revenue maximization; ve-49
hicular users may decide to get Internet connectivity from50
one operator or the other depending on the corresponding51
price and the current network conditions. This manuscript52
builds on our preliminary work in [11], further extending the53
network scenario by considering that users can change their54
acceptance/refusal strategy (or equivalently, their price pref-55
erences) while they travel along the stretch of road. We in-56
vestigate how this variation inﬂuences the pricing strategies57
of providers. Such a question is linked to the speciﬁcities of58
vehicular networks, and to the best of our knowledge has59
not been studied in the scientiﬁc literature. Among the unex-60
pected results, we observed that users increasing their price61
acceptance threshold between the two RSUs, if anticipated62
by providers, strongly impacts the competition among them63
and can lead to lower prices and lower provider revenues64
(with respect to the case when users have ﬁxed price accep-65
tance thresholds).66
The manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 gives67
an overview of the related work further commenting on68
the main novelties and contributions of the present work;69
70
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The suitability of WLAN hotspots for providing Internet 89
access in vehicular scenario is studied in [7,22,28]. In [22], 90
mobile users exploit temporary WLAN connections during 91
their road trip to download/upload contents form/to the In- 92
ternet; the main challenge addressed in this work is to main- 93
tain a seamless connectivity even if the physical connec- 94
tion with a road side access point may get lost temporarily. 95
Along the same lines, automatic access point association/de- 96
association procedures are studied in [24,26] in the very 97
same vehicular network architecture. Besides a purely theo- 98
retical studies, special equipments for highly mobile scenar- 99
ios are in development, among which a router with 3G and 100
WLAN interfaces is designed to ensure seamless handovers, 101
proposed by NEC Corporation in 2005. In [25], the authors 102
discuss the requirements for such a router and test their own 103
prototype of modular access gateway. 104
Another research area related to this work deals with the 105
optimal design of vehicular networks, where the problem 106
mainly scales down to eﬃciently deploying RSU to maxi- 107
mize the “quality” perceived by the mobile user in terms of 108
download/upload throughput, and/or latency to retrieve con- 109
tents form the Internet through the deployed RSUs. Trullols 110
et al. [30] consider different formulations for the deployment 111
problem and introduce heuristics based on local-search and 112
greedy approaches to get suboptimal solutions. A solution 113
based on genetic algorithms is studied by Cavalcante et al. 114
[4]. Yan et al. [32] study the optimal RSU deployment prob- 115
lem, where candidate places for RSU location are crossroads. 116
A comprehensive description of the general problem of op- 117
timal RSU deployment by a single entity can be found in [2] 118
and [36]. A different scenario, where several providers de- 119
ploy their RSUs in a competitive manner is studied in [8], 120
and the same problem but for general wireless networks is 121
considered in [1]. 122
Researchers often use game theory to study competition 123
between providers. In [19] the authors survey various game- 124
theoretic models for evaluating the competition between 125
agents in vehicular networks. The mobile users competition 126
is studied in [20], where users share the same RSU. In [18] 127
128
- 129
- 130
. 131
132
133
- 134
135
- 136
s 137
e 138
e 139Section 3 introduces the reference scenario and the related
modeling assumptions; in Section 4, we analyze the cas
where the pricing policy of one vehicular Internet provide
is ﬁxed and the competitor best-responds to it. Section 5 an
alyzes the non-cooperative game between vehicular Interne
providers, focusing on the consequences in terms of provide
revenues and user welfare. Further comments on the mod
eling assumptions and concluding remarks are reported in
Section 6.
2. Related workThough vehicular networks are far from being widely
deployed, the research community already started to ex-
tensively study different problems and challenges likely to
arise in the future. Many articles are devoted to the def-
inition/adaptation of communication protocols for the ve-
hicular context (like in [3,14,33–35]), studying the suit-
ability of already existing technologies and proposing new
approaches. The main challenge here is to develop a reliable
protocol for V2V communications.
l 140
s 141
, 142
- 143
- 144
Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008a hierarchical game is proposed to analyze the competition
between OBUs and RSUs. Differently, in [27] a coalition for
mation game among RSU is analyzed, with the aim of bet
ter exploiting V2V communications for data dissemination
More generally, good surveys on game theory applications in
wireless networks are [5] and [29].
In this paper, unlike in the previously described refer
ences we ignore V2V communications and focus only on
users which aim to establish Internet connection. In that con
text, we consider price competition between Internet acces
providers in the case of vehicular networks, which is, to th
best of our knowledge, a novel issue. The scientiﬁc literatur
contains several analyses of provider competition in genera
wireless networks (e.g., [6,17,31]), but, even if V2I network
bear some similaritieswith genericwireless access networks
they have speciﬁc features which make the pricing prob
lem worth analyzing. Indeed, in generic wireless access networks, the network operator competition is generally over 145
the “common” users, that is, those users which fall in the 146
coverage area of the competing network providers. In other 147
words, competition between providers arise only if the cover- 148
age areas of the networks (partially) overlap as in [17]. Users 149
rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Nemselves tend to select an access point which maximizes
me quality measure as in [9]. On the other hand, in V2I net-
orks competition may arise due to vehicles mobility even if
e coverage areas of competing RSUs do not overlap, since if
n RSU does not serve a moving vehicle in its own coverage
nge, the very same user can be served later by competing
perators; in this case users do not really make a network
lection decision, rather they answer the binary question of
hether or not to connect to the currently observed network.
In contrast to [11], where we analyze competition among
ternet access providers, in the current study we also fo-
s on customers and their welfare. We assume that mo-
ile users may deviate from their original pricing preferences
fter receiving additional information about the connection
st. More speciﬁcally, we consider that the users are some-
ow risk-averse and can modify their connection budget
fter passing an access pointwithout being served. Thismod-
cation, if it is a common feature/strategy of users popu-
tion, may lead to several interesting outcomes and pecu-
arities, such as connection prices drops and, sequentially,
roviders revenue losses.
. Reference scenario and modeling assumptions
We consider a stretch of a highway where two Internet
ccess providers coexist. However, our model is applicable
r scenarios where the number of RSUs at each provider’s
isposal is arbitrary, even with non-overlapping coverage ar-
as, with the constraint that available providers are not al-
rnating along the road, that is, users may cross several re-
ions covered by Provider 1, then several covered by Provider
(or vice-versa). This model represents the case of local ac-
ss providers along a freeway for example; the case of RSUs
om alternating providers is not covered here, and is left for
ture work.
Note that in this article we do not treat the cases when
ore than two Internet access providers compete. In such
ses the RSU location would be of high importance, which
e highlight here by brieﬂy evoking a scenario with three
roviders. The provider whose RSU is located between the
o others is obviously in a disadvantageous position, since
e can only serve users who were unserved by competitors.
or example, in the case of low user ﬂows (no congestion),
e “middle” provider only sees users with low willingness-
-pay (since they refused the offer of the ﬁrst provider they
et) and should therefore set relatively low prices. In the
eneral case, this “middle” provider would absorb some of
e unserved traﬃc of the two others, hence reducing the in-
ractions between the extremity providers. Since those in-
ractions are the focus of this paper, we believe the two-
rovider case highlights better the speciﬁcities of vehicular
etworks (with users arriving from both directions and af-
cting the relationships among providers). Finally, the two-
rovider case is suﬃciently simple to allow us to reach ana-
tical results, while considering more providers is likely to
e treatable only through numerical studies.
For the sake of easing up presentation, we assume that
SUs are totally identical and have the same individual good-
ut (or capacity) c. It is worth pointing out that the model-
g framework can be extended to the case where the RSUs
wned by the different providers have different capacitylease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008alues. The providers’ RSU locations differ, and thus vehi-
les taking the road in one direction ﬁrst enter the coverage
rea of Provider 1’s RSU, while those traveling in the oppo-
te direction ﬁrst see Provider 2. We denote by λj, j = 1,2
e average number of commuters per time unit that ﬁrst
eet Provider j’s RSU; they will cross the competitor’s cov-
rage area afterwards. Note that we will treat those average
rrivals number as constant, i.e., we reason as if there are ex-
ctly λj commuters per time unit seeing Provider j ﬁrst.
Each user wants to establish an Internet connection to
ownload data ﬁles. The average volume of these ﬁles per
ser is normalized to 1 without loss of generality, and we
ill also treat the ﬁle volume as a constant. Hence the to-
l demand (in term of data volume) of users seeing Provider
ﬁrst is also λj. We assume that the RSUs coverage area and
e vehicles’ speed do not constrain ﬁle transfers: if a RSU’s
apacity exceeds its (average) load, all requests are success-
lly served, otherwise some requests (taken randomly) are
jected.
Each provider j = 1,2 set a (ﬂat-rate) price pj to charge
r the connection service. However not all users will ac-
ept this price. We model users price preferences by assum-
g that only a proportion w(p) of users accept to pay a unit
rice p for the service. If Provider j charges price pj, users who
rst enter Provider j’s service area generate a demand (again,
er time unit, and treated as static) of w(pj)λj. The function
(·) is called willingness-to-pay function, and we assume
to be non-increasing: each user can be seen as having a
aximum price below which he/she accepts the service, and
bove which he/she refuses to connect, the function w( · )
en represents the complementary cumulative distribution
nction of those acceptance prices among users.
.1. Demand ﬂows
Fig. 1 summarizes the scenario in terms of demand ﬂows.
he total ﬂow λj from users seeing ﬁrst Provider j consists of:
1. users accepting the price pj and being served by
Provider j;
2. users accepting the price pj and being rejected due to
the RSU capacity limit (forming a spillover ﬂow λsp
j
heading to the competitor’s RSU);
3. and users refusing the price pj (forming a ﬂow λ
ref
j
heading to the competitor’s RSU).
The two latter ﬂows then enter the coverage area of the
ompeting provider, where they can be served or not.
We consider here that users may change their price ac-
eptance threshold after meeting one provider and having
ither refused its price or been rejected due to capacity lim-
s. In the following, we analyze both cases in which re-
sed/rejected users increase and decrease their willingness
pay as they go by. It is worth noting that these behaviors
re well representative of realistic situations:
• willingness-to-pay increases, if the user’s request was re-
jected due to congestion, this signal of resource scarcity
may increase the user’s willingness-to-pay; alternatively,
users may know that there are several RSUs on the high-
way they are using, and hence may “take a bet” for the
ﬁrst RSU they meet, by being more demanding than theyin competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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e 316Fig. 1. Flows involved in the model: among the total potential demand λj
not served by this provider), λref
j
(demand from users refusing to pay pj). A
the same ﬂows, indexed by k, for users traveling in the opposite direction.
Fig. 2. How willingness to pay fo
could really afford. The logic in this case is that probabl
the next RSUs are cheaper. As more RSUs are crossed, th
risk raises to ﬁnd no other RSU (or only more expensiv
ones) before some delay limit, hence a higher price ac
ceptance threshold after passing each RSU;
• willingness-to-pay decreases, if the content the user i
requesting is time-sensitive, that is, the user wants
speciﬁc content at a speciﬁc time, the additional dela
on content retrieval the user experiences for being re
jected/refused may lead the user to value less the con
tent/connectivity.
This change in willingness-to-pay impacts two compo
nents of the total available demand at a provider–refused
and spilled-over users from the competitor-, making them
more (or less) valuable for the provider (who may extrac
more or less revenue from those users). Note that this can b
easily extended to a scenario when each provider owns sev
eral (consecutive) RSUs; there, each user would change hi
willingness-to-pay when changing provider, not RSUs.
In this paper, we consider a simple multiplicative chang
of the acceptance threshold:
• if a user refused to pay the price of the ﬁrst RSU he/sh
met, his price acceptance threshold is multiplied by α;
• if a user accepted the price of an RSU but his request wa
rejected due to congestion, his price acceptance threshold
is multiplied by β .Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008rovider j ﬁrst, we distinguish λsp
j
(demand from users agreeing to pay pj , bu
nserved after passing Provider j increase their willingness-to-pay. We deﬁn
ow changes after passing e.g. RSU 2.
To simplify a bit the analysis, we assume in the follow
ing that α = β, i.e., users that are not served modify thei
acceptance threshold price by the same factor, whether the
had accepted or refused the price of the ﬁrst RSU they met
Such an assumption is realistic, if the price variation is inter
preted as a response to the decreasing likelihood of ﬁndin
another (cheap) RSU.
It is worth pointing out that if all users simultaneousl
accept to pay a price α times larger (smaller) than before
then the proportion of users accepting to pay p is changed
from w(p) to w( pα ). Fig. 2 shows an example of how th
willingness-to-pay function changes after users have passed
RSU 2, when no congestion occurs at RSU 2. Some of th
users seeing Provider 2 ﬁrst (a proportion w(p2) of them) ac
cepted to pay the price of Provider 2 and were served, and
thus do not need a connection anymore. The others increas
the maximum price they can afford by α: the proportion o
users seeing Provider 2 ﬁrst and accepting to pay price p1 i
then w(p1/α) − w(p2).
We now decompose formally the components of the use
ﬂows reaching Provider j and accepting to pay his price pj:
1. those seeing Provider j ﬁrst, thus issuing a total de
mand (since they accept to pay pj)
w(pj)λ j;
2. those seeing Provider k = j (the competing provider
ﬁrst, who refused to pay p but would accept the prick
rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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pj (possibly due to the acceptance threshold increase),317
forming a total demand level (smaller than λref
k
, and318
null when pk ≤ pj/α)319
λk[w(pj/α) − w(pk)]+,
where x+ := max (0, x) for x ∈ R;320
3. and those seeing Provider k ﬁrst, who agreed to pay321
pk but were rejected because of Provider k’s limited322
capacity, and who also agree to pay pj, for a total de-323
mand324
min
(
1,
w(pj/α)
w(pk)
)
λsp
k
,
where λsp
k
is the part of the demand w(pk)λk that is325
spilled-over by Provider k.326
The total demand λT
j
(pj, pk) for Provider j then equals the327
sum of the aforementioned components:328
λTj (pj, pk) := w(pj)λ j + λk[w(pj/α) − w(pk)]+
+min
(
1,
w(pj/α)
w(pk)
)
λsp
k
3.2. Rejected users and uniqueness of ﬂows329
When the total demand at an RSU exceeds its capacity,330
some requests are rejected: we assume that the RSU serves331
users up to its capacity, and that rejected requests are se-332
lected randomly among all arrived requests. Thus each re-333
quest submitted to Provider j has an identical probability of334
success Pj, that is simply given by335
P
(
c
)
so336
A337
T338
R
339
P340
a341
a342
λ
R343
e344
Pj
345
sh346 ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
We obtain similar equations when p1 < p2/α and p1 < p2α, 347
by switching the roles of Providers 1 and 2. Further, if p2/α ≤ 348
p1 ≤ p2α then 349⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P1 = min
(
1,
c
w(p1)λ1 + w(p1/α)λ2 − w(p2)λ2P2
)
P2 = min
(
1,
c
w(p2)λ2 + w(p2/α)λ1 − w(p1)λ1P1
)
.
(5)
Finally, if p2/α ≥ p1 ≥ p2α (which can be the case for 350
α < 1) 351⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P1 = min
(
1,
c
w(p1)λ1 + w(p2)λ2 − w(p2)λ2P2
)
P2 = min
(
1,
c
w(p2)λ2 + w(p1)λ1 − w(p1)λ1P1
)
.
(6)
Proposition 1. For any price vector (p1, p2), the systems of 352
equations deﬁned in (4), (5) and (6) have a unique solution. 353
Proof. See Appendix A.  354
4. Single provider best response 355
In this section, we study the situation when provider k 356
has ﬁxed his price pk, and provider j wants to maximize his 357
revenue by setting appropriately his price pj. 358
In our analysis, we will use the monotonicity of the de- 359
mand function of a provider while its capacity remains un- 360
saturated, which we establish now. 361
Lemma 1. The total demand λT
j
of provider j is a continu- 362
ous function of his price pj; that function is in addition non- 363
increasing while provider j is not saturated (i.e., while λT
j
< c). 364
P 365
366
p 367
e 368
p 369
D 370
p
371
w 372
373
p 374
375
p 376⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
377
P
Nj = min 1,
λT
j
(1)
that the served traﬃc at RSU j equals λT
j
Pj = min (c, λTj ).
gain, the probability Pj depends on the price vector (pi, pk).
he corresponding revenue of provider j is then
j = pj min[c, λTj (pj, pk)]. (2)
The traﬃc λsp
j
, that is the part of λj spilled over by
rovider j (and that will then enter the competitor’s coverage
rea) also depends on both prices through the probability Pj,
nd equals
sp
j
= w(pj)λ j(1 − Pj). (3)
egrouping all components of λT
j
, the success probability
quals
= min
(
1,
c
w(pj)λ j+[w(pj/α)−w(pk)]+λk + min[1, w(pj/α)w(pk) ]λ
sp
k
)
.
If p1 > p2α and p1 > p2/α, then those success probabilities
ould satisfy
P1 = min
(
1,
c
w(p1)λ1 + w(p1/α)λ2 − w(p1/α)λ2P2
)
P2 = min
(
1,
c
w(p2)λ2 + w(p2/α)λ1 − w(p1)λ1P1
)
.(4) p 378
lease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008roof. See Appendix B. 
For further analysis, we deﬁne the capacity saturation
rice of a provider as the price for which the total demand
quals his capacity. Remark that this price depends on the
rice of his competitor.
eﬁnition 1. The capacity saturation price of Provider j is
c
j(pk) := inf{p ∈ [0, pmax] : λTj (p, pk) < c}.
Since λT
j
(pmax, pk) = 0, for all pk we know that pcj(pk) al-
ays exists. In addition we have pc
j
(pk) < pmax.
Lemma 1 implies that if pc
j
> 0, then λT
j
(pc
j
, pk) = c and
j ≤ pcj ⇒ λTj ≥ c.
WhenλT
j
(0, pk) ≥ c, λTj (pcj) = c, hence pcj is theminimum
rice such that
w(pc
j
)λ j + λk[w(pcj/α) − w(pk)]+
+ min
(
1,
w(pc
j
/α)
w(pk)
)
λsp
k
= c,
λsp
k
=w(pk)λk
[
[w(pk/α)−w(pcj)]+λ j + w(pk)λk−c
[w(pk/α) − w(pcj)]+λ j + w(pk)λk
]+
.
(7)
Solving this system then yields the capacity saturation
rice pc . From Proposition 1, the demand of Provider j is
j
in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Fig. 4. Revenue of pro
a continuous function of his price. Since we assumed tha
λT
j
(0, pk) ≥ c, and for pj = pmax the demand equals zero
then the system (7) has a solution.
We now provide a piece-wise expression of the revenu
function: the revenue function of each provider j is continu
ous in his price (from the continuity of λT
j
and of Pj), and can
be expressed analytically on different segments.
1. When λT
j
(pj) ≥ c (or pj ≤ pcj(pk) when pcj(pk) > 0)
the RSU capacity of provider j is saturated, and thu
his total load is simply
λTj = c,
the revenue then equals
Rj = pjc.
The corresponding segment of the revenue curve is th
linear part as shown in Fig. 4, and corresponds in Fig. 3Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.0086 8 10
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hen α = 1.3 and pk = 4.
to prices on the left of the capacity saturation curve o
provider j.
2. If pj < pk/α and pj < pkα, then provider k cannot attrac
users having refused the price of provider j:
λTj = w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − w(pk)λk + λspk ,
with
λsp
k
= [w(pk)λk − c]+.
(a) If pk < p
c
k
, then the capacity of provider k is sat
urated and
Rj = pj(w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − c),
(b) Otherwise, provider k is not saturated and
Rj = pj(w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − w(pk)λk).
Only case 2b occurs on the example of Figs. 3 and 4.
3. If pk/α ≤ pj ≤ pkα, then both providers are able to serv
the refused traﬃc of each other:
λTj = w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − w(pk)λk + λspk ,rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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with403
λsp
k
=
[
w(pk)λk
w(pk)λk +w(pk/α)λ j −w(pj)λ j − c
w(pk)λk +w(pk/α)λ j −w(pj)λ j
]+
(a) If pk < p
c
k
, then the capacity of provider k is saturated404
and he gains405
Rj = pj
(
w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk
− c
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j
)
,
(b) Otherwise, provider k is not saturated and his revenue406
is407
Rj = pj
(
w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − w(pk)λk
)
.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate both cases, with the only remark408
that in Fig. 4, cases 2b and 3b constitute one segment409
of the revenue curve (indeed, the expressions of the410
revenue function are identical in both cases).411
4. If pk/α ≥ pj ≥ pkα, then both providers do not serve the412
refused traﬃc:413
λTj = w(pj)λ j + λspk ,
with414
λsp
k
= [w(pk)λk − c]+
(a) If pk < p
c
k
, then the capacity of provider k is satu-415
rated and he gains416
Rj = pj(w(pj)λ j + w(pk)λk − c),
(b) Otherwise, provider k is not saturated and the rev-417
enue is418
Rj = pjw(pj)λ j.
5. If pj > pkα and pj > pk/α, then the total load of provider419
j is420
λTj = w(pj)λ j +
w(pj/α)
w(pk)
λsp
k
,
where421
λsp
k
=
[
w(pk)λk
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j−w(pj)λ j−c
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j
]+
.
(a) If p < pc , then the capacity of provider k is saturated422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
D431
th432
le433
ly434
n435
5. Providers pricing game 436
In this section we consider a non-cooperative game, 437
where providers – the players – simultaneously choose their 438
prices, trying to maximize their individual payoffs given by 439
(2). Our aim is to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game: 440
a pair of prices (p¯1, p¯2), such that no player can increase his 441
payoff by unilaterally changing his price. The underlying as- 442
sumption is that each provider knows in real time the current 443
price of its competitor and is able to instantly adapt to it; but 444
even if it is not the case, the providers can use the Nash equi- 445
librium outcome as a prediction of their perfect information 446
competition, and simultaneously charge equilibrium prices. 447
Further, we investigate the situation where providers would 448
decide to cooperate, trying to maximize the sum of their in- 449
dividual revenues (as a monopolist would do). We analyze 450
how much the providers may lose in terms of total revenue 451
by refusing to cooperate. 452
We ﬁrst formally deﬁne the pricing game. 453
Deﬁnition 2. The providers pricing game is the 3-tuple 454
G = (N, P,R),
where N = {1,2} is the set of players (the two providers), P = 455
(P1, P2) = (0, pmax]2 is the space of players strategies and R = 456
(R1,R2) is players payoffs or revenues given in (2). 457
We are interested in ﬁnding the Nash equilibrium of that 458
pricing game. 459
Deﬁnition 3. A pair of prices (p¯1, p¯2) is a Nash equilibrium 460
for the pricing game if 461{
R1(p¯1, p¯2) ≥ R1(p1, p¯2) for all p1 ∈ (0, pmax],
R2(p¯1, p¯2) ≥ R2(p¯1, p2) for all p2 ∈ (0, pmax].
Nash equilibria can be interpreted as predictions for the 462
outcome of the competition between selﬁsh entities, as- 463
sumed rational and taking decisions simultaneously. For sim- 464
plicity in this section we use the linear willingness-to-pay 465
function, however the analogical results can be obtained for 466
any other convex non-increasing function numerically. 467
5 468
469
p 470
ti 471
a 472
473
o 474
li 475
F 476
P 477
p 478
n 479{
480
if 481
P
Nk k
and his revenue is
Rj = pj
(
w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk
× w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j − c
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j
)
,
(b) Otherwise, provider k is not saturated and his revenue
is simply
Rj = pjw(pj)λ j .
We can observe both cases in Figs. 3 and 4, where
the plots are for a linear willingness-to-pay function
w(p) = [1 − p/10]+, c = 10 and λ1 = λ2 = 11. Unless
stated otherwise, the same parameters are taken for
all plots in the rest of the article.
ue to the complex form of the revenue function, computing
e optimal price as a response to the price of the opponent
ads to considering many subcases and hence appears ana-
tically intractable. However, it is quite easy to compute it
umerically on each segment and select the best one.lease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008.1. Large capacities regime
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that RSU ca-
acities exceed the total user ﬂow (i.e., c ≥ λ j + λk). In par-
cular, for any price proﬁle RSU capacities are not saturated,
nd there is no spillover traﬃc.
This assumption is not necessarily restrictive; indeed in
ur previous study [11] we have established that at an equi-
brium (if any) of the pricing game, no provider is saturated.
ormally:
roposition 2 ([11]). If (p¯ j, p¯k) is an equilibrium in the
roviders pricing game in the homogeneous ﬂows case, then
ecessarily
p¯ j > p
c
j
(p¯k),
p¯k > p
c
k
(p¯ j).
For homogeneous user ﬂows (i.e., λ1 = λ2), we claim that
there is an equilibrium in the general capacities case, it isin competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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535
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537
- 538
539
540identical to the one with large capacities. Thus, the large ca
pacity case contains all the equilibria we may have with ar
bitrary capacities; however those price proﬁles may not b
equilibria in the general case.
5.2. Providers competition
The revenue expressions are again deﬁned by segment
(only two now, because of the large-capacity assumption):
Rj =
{
pj
(
w(pj)λ j +w
(
pj
α
)
λk−w(pk)λk
)
if pj ≤ pkα
pjw(pj)λ j otherwise
In the rest of this section, we derive analytical expression
for the particular case of a linear willingness-to-pay function
of the form w(p) = [1 − p/pmax]+ for some constant pmax .
We are interested in obtaining the best response function
BRj(pk) of each provider j, that is the function indicating th
optimal price to set as a response to the competitor’s pric
pk. For the best response function of provider j we isolat
only two candidate values from the revenue piecewise ex
pressions above:
1. On the segment [0, pkα], the best response of Provider
is
BRaj = min
(
pkα,
pmaxλ j + pkλk
2λ j + 2λk/α
)
.
which is strictly below pkα if pk >
pmaxλ j
2λ jα+λk .
2. On the segment [pkα, ∞), Provider j maximizes his rev
enue with
BRbj = max (pkα, pmax/2),
which is strictly larger than pkα if pk <
pmax
2α .
Now remark that
pmaxλ j
2λ jα+λk <
pmax
2α , hence because of th
continuity of the revenue function:
• if pk <
pmaxλ j
2λ jα+λk the best response is BR j = pmax/2;
• if pk >
pmax
2α the best response is BR j =
pmaxλ j+pkλk
2λ j+2λk/α ;
• for
pmaxλ j
2λ jα+λk ≤ pk ≤
pmax
2α , we have to compare the tw
best-response candidates above, which we do now in th
case of symmetric ﬂows.
Proposition 3. Assume user ﬂows are homogeneous, i.e., λ1 =
λ2 = λ, and consider a linear willingness-to-pay function
w(p) = [1 − p/pmax]+. Then the best-response of Provider j is
BR j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pmax + pk
2 + 2/α if pk ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
pmax
2
otherwise.
Proof. Let us focus on the regionwhere
pmaxλ j
2λ jα+λk ≤ pk ≤
pmax
2α
In that region,
Rj(BR
b
j) =
pmax
4
λ
andPlease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008Rj(BR
a
j) =
pmax + pk
2 + 2/α λ
[
1 −
1 + pk
pmax
2 + 2/α −
1 + pk
pmax
2α + 2 +
pk
pmax
]
= pmax + pk
α(2 + 2/α)2 λ
[
α + 1 + α pk
pmax
+ pk
pmax
]
.
The difference Rj(BR
a
j) − Rj(BRbj) has the same sign as
p2k
1
pmax
+ 2pk −
pmax
α
,
which is positive iff pk ≥ pmax(
√
1 + 1α − 1). Finallywe chec
that for all α,
1/(2α + 1) <
√
1 + 1
α
− 1 < 1/(2α),
which concludes the proof. 
At a Nash equilibrium (p∗
1
, p∗
2
), each provider is playing
best-response to the price set by the competitor. As a result
three types of equilibrium can occur:
• a symmetric Nash equilibrium, of the form (BRa1,BR
a
2)
leading to
p∗1 = p∗2 =
pmax
(
2
λ2
j
α + λ2k + 2λkλ j
)
4
(
λk + λ jα
)(
λ j + λkα
)
− λ jλk
; (8
• a symmetric Nash equilibrium, of the form (BRb1,BR
b
2)
leading to
p∗1 = p∗2 =
pmax
2
; (9
• an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, with one provider (say
Provider j) playing BRaj and the other one playing BR
b
k
leading to{
p∗
j
= pmax(λ j+λk/2)
2λ j+2λk/α
p∗
k
= pmax/2
(10
Considering again the homogeneous ﬂow case, we deter
mine the conditions on α for those price proﬁles to be Nash
equilibria.
1. From Proposition 3, the symmetric equilibrium described
in (8) exists only when
p∗1 ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
,
i.e. when 2/α+3
4(1+1/α)2−1 ≥
√
1 + 1α − 1, which holds if and
only if α ≥
√
4
3 .
2. For the symmetric equilibrium described in (9), the con
dition of existence is:{
pmax/2 ≤ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
,
which is equivalent to α ≤ 0.8.rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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P
NTable 1
Nash equilibria of the pricing game, with homogeneous ﬂows and a
linear willingness-to-pay function.
Case Equilibrium prices
α ≤ 0.8 1 equilibrium p∗1 = p∗2 = pmax/2
α ∈ [0.8, s] 2 equilibria
{
p∗1 = 3pmax/(4 + 4/α)
p∗2 = pmax/2
and{
p∗1 = pmax/2
p∗2 = 3pmax/(4 + 4/α)
α ∈ (s,
√
4
3
) No equilibrium
α ≥
√
4
3
1 equilibrium p∗1 = p∗2 = pmax 2/α+34(1+1/α)2−1
. For the asymmetric equilibrium described in (10), the
conditions of existence are:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pmax/2 ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
,
3pmax/2
2 + 2/α ≤ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
.
The ﬁrst condition is equivalent to α ≥ 0.8, while the sec-
ond one holds if and only if α ≤ s, where s ≈ 1.0766.
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes we can ex-
ect from the pricing game, depending on the value of α.
hen α ≤ 0.8 both providers do not serve refused traﬃc
nd set prices as if there was no competitor. When α = 1,
the case of large capacities we have two similar equilibria,
which one provider charges a higher price than his com-
etitor (and thus serves only users seeing him ﬁrst) while the
cond provider serves traﬃc from both directions. When α
creases, at those equilibria the low price increases: users
ho refused to pay the high price increase their willingness-
-pay before meeting the low-price provider, allowing the
tter to make more revenue through a (moderate) price in-
ease.
0 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Symme
p
k
BRk↪ α =
BRj ↪ α =
BRk↪ α =
BRj ↪ α =
Fig. 5. Best responslease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008But at some α = s, this lower equilibrium price becomes
igh enough to encourage the opponent to decrease his own
rice, in order to also serve some users who refused to pay
e price of the opponent (those users becomemore valuable
ecause of the large α). This is the situation when the pricing
ame between providers has no equilibrium.
Finally, when α becomes high enough, each provider
rves some users who refused the price of his competitor;
e corresponding equilibrium is symmetric.
Two sets of best responses curves are shown in Fig. 5, for
ifferent α values illustrating the different types of equilib-
a. We observe that the prices in the symmetric equilibrium
re lower than prices in asymmetric ones, which means that
sers accepting to pay more (through a larger α) may lead to
situation where providers charge lower prices, a counter-
tuitive phenomenon. At the symmetric equilibrium, both
roviders serve some refused ﬂows of each other due to the
illingness-to-pay variation (when α > 1), while in asym-
etric equilibria only one provider can serve the refused ﬂow
f its competitor; the former provider being then the one
ith the higher revenue. Note that the best response func-
ons are discontinuous, implying that for some values of α,
ere may be no Nash equilibrium.
The price decrease of the provider who had originally (for
= 1) the lowest price can be explained as follows: when
e opponent decreases his price (that is lower at the sym-
etric equilibrium than at the original one) the refused ﬂow
duces, and the inﬂuence of α is only on users from that
ow who later accept to pay the proposed price. Thus, the
rovider is interested in lowering the price to attract more of
ose users.
Fig. 6 shows the corresponding equilibrium prices de-
ending on α and Fig. 7 plots the equilibrium revenue of
oth providers. These ﬁgures conﬁrm that for some values
f α, providers decrease their prices with respect to the ref-
rence case α = 1, resulting in a decrease of their total rev-
nue. Surprisingly, for α approximately between 1.17 and 1.2,
oth providers set lower prices than when α = 1. When con-
dering the average price per served used, the decrease (still
6 8 10
2 asymmetric NE
pj
es for various α.in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Fig. 7. Providers revenue in the cooperativ
when compared to the case α = 1) occurs when α ∈ [1.17,
1.52], approximately.
Now looking at the case α < 1, we notice that when α <
0.8 both providers charge the same price, which is the one
they would have set had they been alone. This holds because
for low α, the users who refused the price of the ﬁrst RSU
they met would only accept very low prices for the second
RSU, hence being of poor interest for the latter RSU owners.
Providers are then better off focusing on their own direction
ﬂows.
Fig. 6 also illustrates that for approximately 1.075 ≤
α ≤ 1.17, the game has no Nash equilibrium. This sit-
Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.0081.2 1.4 1.6
av. price decreased
ces decreased
α
Higher price (asym. eq.)
Lower price (asym. eq.)
Average price (asym. eq.)
Common price (sym. eq.)
that for the symmetric equilibrium the average price is the (common) pric
max/2 (asym. eq.)
pmax/(4 + 4/α) (asym. eq.)
librium revenue
ue with cooperation1.2 1.4
α
e and competitive equilibrium cases.
uation arises when the refused ﬂows at both sides be- 609
come more important: due to the willingness-to-pay in- 610
crease (when α > 1),users seeing the other provider ﬁrst 611
become a higher source of revenue and have more inﬂu- 612
ence on each provider’s pricing decision. For the evoked 613
range of values for α, this leads each provider to set a 614
price below its competitor’s until a point where focus- 615
ing on one’s ﬂow–by setting large prices–is better, so that 616
best-response curves do not intersect. Predicting the prices 617
that are then chosen is diﬃcult, since for any proﬁle of 618
prices at least one provider could do better by changing his 619
price. 620
rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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5.3. Cooperation among providers621
For comparison purposeswe consider the situationwhere622
both providers cooperate when setting their prices, that is,623
the operators are no longer selﬁsh, but rather have the com-624
mon objective of maximizing the sum of their revenues. This625
implies that the operators share all the information about626
their pricing policies and act as a single entity.627
We again assume homogeneous user ﬂows, i.e., λ1 = λ2 =628
λ. Without loss of generality we assume that the optimal629
prices are such that pj ≤ pk.630
To ﬁnd such optimal prices, we again consider the two631
price zones where the revenue expressions differ:632
1. First, if pj ≤ pkα and pj ≤ pkα, the total revenue is633
RT = pj
(
w(pj)λ + w
(
pj
α
)
λ − w(pk)λ
)
+ pkw(pk)λ.
For a linear willingness-to-pay function, taking the634
partial derivatives yields635
∂RT
∂ pj
= λ
(
1 − pj
pmax
(2 + 2/α) + pk
pmax
)
= 0,
∂RT
∂ pk
= λ
(
1 + pj
pmax
− 2pk
pmax
)
= 0,
leading to the optimal price values636 ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p¯ j =
3pmax
3 + 4/α ,
p¯k =
(3 + 2/α)pmax
3 + 4/α ,
for α ≤ 0.5 +
√
11/12. The corresponding total rev-637
enue is then638
R¯′
T = pmaxλ(9α + 15 + 4/α)
α(3 + 4/α)2 .
2. If
pk
α < pj( < pkα), the total revenue is:639
RT = pj
(
w(pj)λ + w
(
pj
α
)
λ − w(pk)λ
)
+ pk
(
w(pk)λ + w
(
pk
α
)
λ − w(pj)λ
)
.
Again, partial derivatives give:640
∂RT
∂ pj
= λ
(
1 − pj
pmax
(2 + 2/α) + 2pk
pmax
)
= 0,
∂RT = λ
(
1 − pk (2 + 2/α) + 2pj
)
= 0,
641
642
643
Again, partial derivatives give: 644
∂RT
∂ pj
= λ
(
1 − 2pj
pmax
)
= 0,
∂RT
∂ pk
= λ
(
1 − 2pk
pmax
)
= 0,
and the optimal prices are 645
p¯ j = p¯k =
pmax
2
,
yielding a total revenue 646
R¯′′′
T = pmaxλ
4
.
Now we derive the conditions to have R¯′
T ≥ R¯′′T : 647
pmaxλ(9α + 15+ 4/α)
α(3 + 4/α)2
≥ pmaxαλ
2
⇔ 9α3 + 6α2 − 14α − 8 < 0,
and we have only one positive root α¯ ≈ 1.215 < 0.5 + 648√
11/12. We have to compare R¯′′′
T
and R¯′
T
. It appears that R¯′
T
649
is always greater than R¯′′′
T
for positive α values. 650
Therefore, 651⎧⎨
⎩
α ∈ [1, α¯] RT = pmaxλ(9α + 15 + 4/α)
α(3 + 4/α)2 ,
α > α¯ RT = pmaxαλ
2
.
Fig. 7 plots the individual revenues of both providers in 652
the competition and cooperation cases assuming an equal 653
share of cooperative revenue among providers for the lat- 654
ter, a reasonable assumption under homogeneous conditions 655
(symmetric traﬃc ﬂows, equal capacity, same willingness- 656
to-pay function for users traveling in both directions). It ap- 657
pears that cooperation would improve the revenue of both 658
providers, even the one that had the most favorable position 659
in the asymmetric equilibrium. 660
5.4. The impact on user surplus 661
In this section we consider the equilibria of the pricing 662
game from the point of view of users. Note that our model 663
does not deﬁne a measure for individual customer eﬃciency: 664
each customer is either fully served–getting a utility equal to 665
his willingness-to-pay–or not served at all–getting zero util- 666
ity; in case of congestion at an RSU, the unserved users are 667
chosen uniformly among those accepting the proposed price. 668
Thus, instead of eﬃciency we use user surplus, that is the dif- 669
fe 670
tu 671
th 672
si 673
α 674
a 675
th 676
677
p 678
th 679
su 680
P
N∂ pk pmax pmax
and the optimal prices are
p¯ j = p¯k =
pmaxα
2
,
yielding a total revenue
R¯′′
T = pmaxαλ
2
.
3. If pkα < pj <
pk
α , the total revenue is:
TR = pjw(pj)λ + pkw(pk)λ. U
lease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008rence betweenwhat users wanted to pay andwhat they ac-
ally payed. We focus here on the large capacity case. Recall
at user willingness-to-pay varies in our scenario: we con-
der the initial willingness-to-pay as the reference: when
> 1, users served by the second provider met may actu-
lly pay more than they originally wanted to pay; in this case
eir surplus will be considered negative.
If we consider just one ﬂow direction λj and denote by
j the price of the ﬁrst provider this ﬂow meets, and by pk
e price of the second one, then the positive part of users
rplus is as follows:
+
∫ pmax ∫ pj +S
j
=
pj
w(p)λdp+
pk
[w(p) − w(pj)] λdp,
in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Fig. 8. Users surplus of λ1 ﬂow when p1 > p2. (For interpretation of th
references to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web versio
of this article).
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Fig. 9. Users surplus of λ1 ﬂow when p2 > p1. (For interpretation of th
references to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web versio
of this article).
which includes surplus from users served by j, and by k. Th
negative part of users surplus is:
US−
j
= [w(pk/α) − max (w(pj),w(pk))]+(pk − pk/α)λ
−
∫ min (pj ,pk)
pk/α
[w(p) − max (w(pj),w(pk))]+λdp,
which includes users refusing price pj and accepting a pric
pk higher than their original willingness-to-pay. Note that th
expression of US−
j
is general enough to cover both cases pj >
pk and pj < pk.
Figs. 8 and 9 illustrate the logic behind the computation o
user surplus when p1 > p2 and p1 < p2, respectively. The red
surface is the negative part of user surplus (when they pa
more than initially willing to), and yellow zones correspond
to the positive part of users surplus.
With a linear willingness-to-pay function, we have
US+
j
= (pmax − pj)w(pj)
λ + (w(pk)−w(pj))[pj − pk]+
λ2 2
Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
Networks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008and
US−
j
= λ
2
(w(pk/α) − w(pk))(pk − pk/α)
− λ
2
(w(pj) − w(pk))[pk − pj]+
and the total user surplus is
US = US+
j
+US+
k
−US−
j
−US−
k
.
Fig. 10 shows total users surplus for different α values fo
large capacities, in the similar settings as before. We can se
that it is consistent with what we observed about the aver
age price payed by user: for a whole range of α values, user
surplus increases, which means that accepting to pay mor
led to the situation when (overall) users pay less.
5.5. Numerical analysis for different willingness-to-pay
functions
Because of the complexity of the model, it is hard to prov
analytically that for any function w there is a range of α val
ues such that awillingness-to-pay increases between the tw
providers met (by a factor α) actually leads to a decrease in
the prices set by providers. Note that it is possible to prov
the existence of at least one symmetric equilibrium when α
is large in the large-capacity case, but we cannot say anythin
about its quality.
In this section, we carry out a numerical analysis fo
some willingness-to-pay function examples, not restrictin
ourselves to linear ones. We are in particular interested in
ﬁnding a minimum willingness-to-pay variation value α¯ fo
which a symmetric equilibrium appears, and compare th
prices in this equilibrium with those for the case α = 1.
We consider the following functions:
• Linear: w(p) = 1 − ppmax
• Square: w(p) = (1 − ppmax )2
• Power Law (C, n): w(p) = C
C+pn
• Exponential: w(p) = 1
ep
Table 2 shows provider prices at equilibrium, when ther
is no variation (α = 1) and when the variation leads to
symmetric equilibrium. For the willingness-to-pay function
considered, which follow our convexity andmonotonicity as
sumptions, we still observe a price decrease after some α
illustrating that this phenomenon does not only occur with
linear w functions.
We also consider in Appendix C the case where user
moving in different directions modify their willingness-to
pay differently (i.e., one value of α for each direction). Thi
scenario can correspond to situation when the highwa
stretch under consideration is close to a city area; users head
ing toward the city can anticipate to have several other con
nection opportunities (hence a low α), while those leavin
the city face a higher risk of not ﬁnding other (cheap) way
to connect (hence a higher α).
6. Discussion and perspectives
This work studies competition between Internet acces
providers in vehicular networks in scenarios where userrs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Table 2
Equilibrium prices decrease for different willingne
w(p) Equilibrium prices, α = 1
Linear (3.75, 5.0)
Square (2.35, 3.33)
Power law (5, 2.2) (1.35, 1.92)
Exponential (0.65, 1.0)
may change their pricing preferences as they travel, since741
they are less and less likely to be offered another connection742
possibility. We analyzed the optimal behavior of a provider,743
given the opponent’s price ﬁxed. This allowed us to charac-744
terize the outcomes (equilibria) of the competition among745
revenue-interested providers playing on prices.746
Our ﬁnding is that the changes of users willingness-747
to-pay drastically impact the provider competition: users748
increasing their willingness-to-pay as they travel (a priori749
giving providers more latitude to make more revenues by in-750
creasing prices) can lead to counterintuitive situations where751
p752
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su766
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799
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802
P
Nroviders lower their prices and make fewer revenues, while
ducing the average price payed by users. That phenomenon
as observed for different types of willingness-to-pay
nctions.
The proposed modeling framework involves simplifying
ssumptions, which stems from the usual tension between
aving a realistic and insightful model and keeping it analyt-
ally tractable. First, we assume that all users undergo the
me relative change in their price acceptance threshold (the
rice they accept to pay) between the two RSUs, i.e., the same
. In a more detailed model, we may expect α to vary with
e application involved, with the speciﬁc user (αwould then
e modeled as a random variable), and/or with the initial
rice acceptance threshold value. Also, besides classical as-
mptions allowing to apply game theory (player rationality,
erfect information about ﬂow levels and opponent strate-
ies), we assume that providers know users’ willingness-to-
ay and how it varies. Such an assumption can be justiﬁed
s vehicular Internet providers may get to know the users’
illingness-to-pay function through dynamic learning tech-lease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.0081.2 1.4
surplus increase
α
rium for various α.
ss-to-pay functions.
Equilibrium prices, α = α¯ α¯
(3.68, 3.68) 1.16
(2.27, 2.27) 1.2
(1.32, 1.32) 1.17
(0.59, 0.59) 1.25
iques and/or statistical inference. Then, a provider knowing
e price of the opponent can estimate how the willingness-
-pay varies over time (the parameter α): the fraction of
sers accepting to pay some price after refusing the price
f the opponent indeed corresponds to a conditional prob-
bility that depends on both prices and on α; the provider
an thus vary his price and observe the demand level to
stimate α.
Despite the assumptions made, we believe that the pro-
osed model provides insights on interesting phenomena,
ke the appearance of a symmetric equilibrium while there
as not any when α equals 1.
Natural follow ups for this work include:
• the analysis of larger network scenarios where each In-
ternet provider owns a whole infrastructure of access
points, spread (evenly or not) over the road, forming sev-
eral connectivity islands; the analysis developed in this
work for the case of 2-providers competition can be lever-
aged as a building block to address “larger” networkswith
higher number of providers and different network ge-
ometry. One possible approach could be to reduce such
more complex scenarios to multiple 2-providers games.
It is worth pointing out that including generic geome-
tries for the deployment of RSUs may lead the competi-
tion outcomes to differ signiﬁcantly, since relative posi-
tion of providers’ RSU have a drastic impact;
• the analysis of network scenarios where some a priori in-
formation is available on the providers’ pricing strategies
and/or the users become ”strategic”, that is, they become
active players by properly setting their willingness-to-pay
threshold (or entire function); this new setting, though,in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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completely changes the structure of the competition and803
would call for a brand new modeling approach.804
• the analysis of scenarios with consolidated incumbent805
providers and new providers willing to enter the market;806
this framework would call for changing the modeling ap-807
proach resorting to leader-follower game representations.808
• the analysis of network scenarios where the position of809
the RSUs is not pre-ﬁxed, but rather each provider, be-810
sides setting the price for the service, may also decide811
where to deploy the network infrastructure. This set-812
ting requires ample modiﬁcations of the game theoretic813
framework.814
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1821
We ﬁrst assume that p1 > p2α and p1 > p2/α. Since the822
right-hand sides of the equations in (4) are continuous in (P1,823
P2) and fall in the interval [0, 1], Brouwer’s ﬁxed-point theo-824
rem [13] guarantees the existence of a solution to the system.825
To establish uniqueness, remark that P2 is uniquely de-826
ﬁned by P1 through the second equation in (4), so (P1, P2)827
is unique if P1 is unique. But P1 is a solution in [0, 1] of the828
829
830
-831
e832
e833
,834
835
x¯836
837
-838
839
)
.840
-841
842
843
t844
t845
846
-847
s848
e849
850
By symmetry, we have the same kind of results when 851
p2/α ≥ p1. 852
Then, we can also prove existence and uniqueness of a so- 853
lution of system (5), when p2/α ≤ p1 ≤ p2α. Here we have 854
g(x) := min
(
1,
1
a + b− dmin
(
1, 1
d+a+−ax
)
)
,
where a = w(p1)λ1c , b =
w(p1/α)λ2
c , d =
w(p2)λ2
c and  = 855
w(p2/α)λ1−w(p1)λ1
c are all positive constants; we again assume 856
a > 0 and b > 0 otherwise the problem is trivial. 857
Differentiating g at x˜, we get 858
g′(x˜) = x˜
2ad
(a + d +  − ax˜)2 ≤
x˜2a
(a + d +  − ax˜) ,
and the rest is similar to the case when p1/α ≥ p2. 859
Finally, we consider the case when p2/α ≥ p1 ≥ p2α. We 860
have: 861
g(x) := min
(
1,
1
a + b− bmin
(
1, 1
b+a−ax
)
)
,
where a = w(p1)λ1c , b =
w(p2)λ2
c . The rest is similar to the ﬁrst 862
case. 863
864
865
866
867
y 868
s 869
870
r 871
872
873
874
, 875
876ﬁxed-point equation x = g(x) with
g(x) := min
(
1,
1
a + b− bmin
(
1, 1
a+b+−ax
)
)
,
where a = w(p1)λ1c , b =
w(p1/α)λ2
c , and  =
(w(p2/α)−w(p1))λ1+(w(p2)−w(p1/α))λ2
c are all positive con
stants; we also assume a > 0 and b > 0 otherwise th
problem is trivial. As a combination of two functions for th
form x → min (1, 1K1−K2x ), g is continuous, nondecreasing
strictly increasing only on an interval [0, x¯] (if any) – it is in
addition convex on that interval –, and constant for x ≥
(note we can have x¯ = 0 or x¯ ≥ 1).
Assume g(x) = x has a solution x˜ ∈ (0, x¯]. Then g is left
differentiable at x˜, and
g′(x˜) = x˜
2ab
(a + b+  − ax˜)2 ≤
x˜2a
(a + b+  − ax˜) (A.1
where we used the fact that x˜ ≤ 1 (as a ﬁxed point of g)
Moreover, since x˜ is in the domain where g is strictly increas
ing we have η := 1
a+b+−ax˜ ≤ 1 on one hand, and x˜ = 1a+b−bη
on the other side. Their combination yields x˜ ≤ 1a and ﬁnally
g′(x˜) ≤ x˜ ≤ 1.
Remark also that g′(x˜) < 1 if x˜ < 1. We ﬁnally use the fac
that g(0) > 0 to conclude that the curve y = g(x) cannot mee
the diagonal y = x more than once: assume two intersection
points x˜1 < x˜2, then g
′(x˜1) < 1 thus the curves cross at x˜1, an
other intersection point x˜ would imply g′(x˜2) > 1 (recall g i
convex when strictly increasing), a contradiction. Hence thuniqueness of the ﬁxed point and of the solution to (4). 877
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Recall that
λTj (pj, pk) = w(pj)λ j + λk[w(pj/α) − w(pk)]+
+ min
(
w(pk),w(pj/α)
)
λk(1 − Pk).
The components of the ﬁrst line are trivially continuous and
non-increasing in pj with our assumptions on w( · ).
The continuity of λT
j
(pj, pk) follows from the continuit
of Pk in the price vector (pj, pk), established in the previou
section.
To establish the monotonicity result, we distinguish fou
cases.
• If pk < pj/α and pk < pjα, then we have
λTj (pj, pk) = w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk(1 − Pk).
When λT
k
< c, then Pk = 1 and λTj is non-increasing in pj.
Now if λT
k
> c then from System (4) (this time with k = 2
j = 1), we have w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ jPj > c and
λTj (pj, pk) = w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk − w(pj/α)
×λk
c
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ jPj
.
Assuming that provider j is not saturated, P = 1. Thenj
rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Nλ′Tj (pj, pk) = w′(pj)λ j +
w′(pj/α)λk
α
− w
′(pj/α)λk
α
− c
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j
+w(pj/α)λk
cw′(pj)λ j
(w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j)2
< w′(pj)λ j +
w′(pj/α)λk
α
− w
′(pj/α)λk
α
+w(pj/α)λk
cw′(pj)λ j
(w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j)2
≤ 0,
here the last inequality comes from the nonincreasingness
f w( · ).
• If pj/α ≤ pk ≤ pjα then
λTj = w(pj)λ j + w(pj/α)λk
− cw(pk)λk
w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ jPj
Assuming that provider j is not saturated and then Pj = 1
we can differentiate in pj:
dλT
j
dpj
= w′(pj)λ j + w′(pj/α)
λk
α
+ cw(pk)w
′(pj)λ jλk
(w(pk)λk + w(pk/α)λ j − w(pj)λ j)2
≤ 0,
where w′ is the derivative of w, and the last inequality
comes from the fact that w′( · ) ≤ 0.
• If pj/α ≥ pk ≥ pjα (for α < 1) then
λTj = w(pj)λ j + w(pk)λk
− cw(pk)λk
w(pk)λk + w(pj)λ j − w(pj)λ jPj
.
Assuming that provider j is not saturated and then Pj =
1:
dλT
j
dpj
= w′(pj)λ j ≤ 0.
• If pk > pjα and pk > pj/α, we show that the success prob-
ability Pk is non-decreasing in pj: applying System (4)
(with k = 1, j = 2) we get that Pk is the solution of the
ﬁxed-point equation x = g(x), where the function g can
be written as
g(x) = min
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝1, c
w(pk)λk+w(pk/α)λ j
[
1− c
w(p j)λ j+w(p j/α)λk−w(pk)λkx
]+
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠.
e then remark that, all else being equal, g(x) is non-
ecreasing in pj, so the solution Pk of the ﬁxed-point equation
(x) = x is also non-decreasing in pj.
As a result, when pk ≥ pj/α the component
in (w(pk),w(pj/α))λk(1 − Pk) decreases with pj, and
does λT.j
lease cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operators
etworks (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008ppendix C. Heterogeneous willingness-to-pay variations
In this section we assume that user pricing preferences
ange differently for both ﬂow directions. Some users may
r example move toward a city and thus expect to meet
ore APs, while the users moving in the opposite direction
re risking not to meet any APs in the nearest future. The for-
er may not increase much their willingness-to-pay, while
e latter have higher risks to fail to establish Internet con-
ection, and thus are more ﬂexible in price perception.
Let us consider that the α values are different for two
ows and that without loss of generality α1 value for users
eing Provider 1 ﬁrst is bigger than for those, seeing ﬁrst
rovider 2, i.e., α1 = hα2 = hα, for some h ≥ 1.
Similarly to the case when α was common to both ﬂow
irections, we consider three cases:
1. If p1 <
p2
α , then{
R1 = p1
(
w(p1)λ1 + w
(
p1
αh
)
λ2 − w(p2)λ2
)
,
R2 = p2w(p2)λ2
and for a linear w(p)⎧⎨
⎩BR
a
1 =
pmaxλ1 + p2λ2
2λ1 + 2λ2αh
,
BRb2 = pmax/2.
and
BRa1(BR
b
2) =
pmax(λ1 + 1/2λ2)
2λ1 + 2λ2αh
.
This is valid for
α ≤ λ1 +
√
λ1
2 + 4λ2/h(λ1 + 1/2λ2)
2λ1 + λ2
,
which in the homogeneous case is equivalent to
α ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 6/h
3
.
2. If
p2
α ≤ p1 ≤ p2αh, then⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R1 = p1
(
w(p1)λ1 + w( p1αh )λ2 − w(p2)λ2
)
,
R2 = p2
(
w(p2)λ2 + w( p2α )λ1 − w(p1)λ1
)
and for a linear w(p)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BRa1 =
pmaxλ1 + p2λ2
2λ1 + 2λ2
αh
,
BRa2 =
pmaxλ2 + p1λ1
2λ2 + 2λ1
α
, .
and⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
BRa1(BR
a
2) =
pmax(2λ1λ2 + 2λ
2
1
α + λ22)
(2λ1 + 2λ2αh )(2λ2 + 2λ1α ) − λ1λ2
,
BRa2(BR
a
1) =
pmax(2λ1λ2 + 2λ
2
2
αh
+ λ21)
(2λ2 + 2λ1α )(2λ1 + 2λ2αh ) − λ1λ2
.
For this equilibrium the condition
p2
α ≤ p1 ≤ p2αh
holds only ifin competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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Fig. C.1. The different types of Nash equilibria in the pricing game when us
α > 1 (resp. hα) after seeing that provider.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
α ≥ −λ1(λ1 − 2λ2) +
√
λ1
2(λ1 − 2λ2)2 + 8λ23/h(λ2 + 2λ1)
2λ2(λ2 + 2λ1)
,
α ≥ −λ2(λ2 − 2λ1) +
√
λ2
2(λ2 − 2λ1)2 + 8λ13h(λ1 + 2λ2)
2hλ1(λ1 + 2λ2)
,
or in the homogeneous ﬂows case:
α ≥ 1 +
√
1 + 24/h
6
.
3. If p1 > p2αh, then{
R1 = p1w(p1)λ1,
R2 = p2
(
w(p2)λ2 + w( p2α )λ1 − w(p1)λ1
)
and for a linear w(p)⎧⎨
⎩
BRb1 = pmax/2,
BRa2 =
pmaxλ2 + p1λ1
2λ2 + 2λ1α
, .
and
BRb2(BR
a
1) =
pmax(λ2 + 1/2λ1)
2λ2 + 2λ1α
,
with the following condition on α to have p1 > p2αh:
α <
λ2 +
√
λ2
2 + 4λ1h(λ2 + 1/2λ1)
2˜h(λ2 + 1/2λ1)
,
or in the homogeneous ﬂows case
α <
1 + √1 + 6h
3h
.Please cite this article as: V. Fux et al., Road-side units operato
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h
e which (BRa1 ↪BR
a
2) exists
which (BRb1↪BR
a
2) exists
which (BRa1 ↪BR
b
2) exists
ng Provider 2 (resp. 1) ﬁrst increase their price acceptance by a multiplicativ
What is different in this new scenario is that we hav
three types of equilibrium now (BRa1,BR
b
2), and (BR
a
1,BR
b
2
are not symmetric anymore. With homogeneous users ﬂow
we have the following conditions:
1. (BRa1,BR
b
2) is an equilibrium when
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BRa1(BR
b
2) < pmax
(√
1 + 1
αh
− 1
)
,
BRb2(BR
a
1) ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
,
α <
1 +
√
1 + 6/h
3
.
or α < min{s/h, 1+
√
1+6/h
3 }.
2. (BRa1,BR
a
2) is an equilibrium when
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BRa1(BR
a
2) ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
αh
− 1
)
,
BRa2(BR
a
1) ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1α − 1
)
,
α ≥ 1 +
√
1 + 24/h
6
.
This set of inequalities is not solvable for αh, but fo
each speciﬁc value of hwe can ﬁnd numerically a con
dition onα for the conditions to hold. This dependenc
is presented on Fig. C.1rs in competition: A game-theoretical approach, Computer
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3. (BRb1,BR
a
2) is an equilibrium when941 ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BRb1(BR
a
2) ≥ pmax
(√
1 + 1
αh
− 1
)
,
BRa2(BR
b
1) < pmax
(√
1 + 1
α
− 1
)
,
α <
1 + √1 + 6h
3h
,
or α < min{s, 1+
√
1+6h
3h
}.942
Fig. C.1 shows threshold α values for different h, showing943
whether there exists a particular type of equilibrium. The ﬁg-944
ure suggests that there is no pair ofα and h such that all three945
types of equilibria exist.946
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